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Abstract 
The increased availability and sales of fairtrade products has resulted in an increased 
number of products with fairness content in the market place. While mainstreaming of 
fairtrade implies that overall fairness and wealth transfers to small producers goes up, it 
may also result in less welfare transfers due to possible dilution of fairtrade principles. This 
paper uses a Hotelling framework of competition to analyze firm behavior with respect to 
the entry of products with fairness content. We analyze how an incumbent supplier reacts 
on a fairtrade entrant and how a fairtrade supplier reacts on a conventional entrant that 
starts offering a product with fairness content with different cost structures. By doing so we 
are able to calculate the firms’ optimal fairness locations and the total amount of fairness 
generated. The results can be used by managers and policy makers in determining the 
optimal strategy when it comes to the amount of fairness content in the market and/or the 
implementation of fairtrade products within development policies. We find that firms’ 
optimal locations are mainly determined by the transfers to smallholders and the distance 
of consumers towards the location of the firm. 
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1. Introduction 
Fairtrade is an increasingly important phenomenon in global trade. The last two decades have shown a 
remarkable growth in sales of fairtrade products. This fits into the increasing societal interest in 
production methods and trade consequences of Western consumption patterns (Goodman 2004; 2010; 
Hertz 2002; Irving, Harrison & Rayner 2002; Klein 2004; Renard 1999). Fairtrade is a concept within 
international trade, envisaging economic exchanges based on fairness principles (FLO 2013). The 
fairtrade movement aims at increasing wealth transfers to small-scale producers in poor developing 
countries by organizing and empowering these “smallholders” in cooperatives. Smallholders are often 
in an unequal bargaining position when it comes to price determination and receive only a small 
fraction of the final product price (Becchetti & Huybrechts 2008; Hira & Ferrie 2006; Raynolds 2002; 
Valkila, Haaparanta & Niemi 2010). Within the fairtrade approach to trade smallholders are paid a 
stable and guaranteed minimum price allowing a decent coverage of production and living costs. The 
Fairtrade Organizations (FTOs) also provide development premiums for projects such as education 
systems and health care to improve local conditions. To facilitate these above market price payments, 
consumers in advanced –mainly Western– economies pay higher prices for comparable products in the 
market.  
In the past decennia the fairtrade concept has seen a large sales growth as a consequence of the 
fairtrade movement going “mainstream” (FLO 2013). On the one hand fairtrade mainstreaming boosts 
the total number of products with fairness content on the market and raises awareness among both 
consumers and supply chain actors (Fridell, Hudson & Hudson 2008; Low & Davenport 2005, 2006; 
Raynolds 2009). Large manufacturers and corporations embracing fairtrade principles may make the 
trade process on the whole “fairer” by guaranteeing an increased amount of farmers a higher level of 
income. On the other hand, mainstreaming may also lead to dilution of the initial fairtrade concept in 
several aspects. Mainstreaming implies increased competition for FTOs in segments that were 
previously exclusive to them (Codron, Siriex & Reardon 2006; Davies 2007; Giovannucci & Ponte 
2005; Max Havelaar 2013; Renard 1999; Smith 2010). This may be due to both an increasing number 
of firms that start to offer fairness in their product lines, and a growing number of fairtrade 
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certification organizations (Codron et al. 2006; Giovannucci & Ponte 2005; Moore, Gibbon & Slack 
2008).  More and larger supply chain actors being involved in the fairtrade movement may put –due to 
competition– pressure on firms to lower their costs, and consequently decrease payments to the 
smallholders (Fridell et al. 2008). Another consequence may be that certain aspects of the original 
fairtrade concept like retaining long-term relationships may not be guaranteed (Davies 2007; Fridell et 
al. 2008; Howard & Jaffee 2013; Jaffee & Howard 2010). Thus, while the growth of fairtrade sales can 
potentially increase its scale and scope, at the same time the final impact of fairtrade may be lower due 
to competitive forces.  
This paper contributes to further clarify the impact of competition on wealth transfers. Within the 
literature on fairtrade, insights on the impact of fairtrade mainstreaming on wealth transfers to 
smallholders are lacking. Also within the economic literature theoretical reflections upon the impact of 
wealth transfers that might induce actors in the market to start adding fairness content in products are 
missing. Exceptions so far are evaluations that also study different types of competition on fairness 
taking into account among others changing consumer attitudes and welfare effects (Becchetti & 
Solferino 2003, 2005; Becchetti, Giallonardo & Tessitore 2006; Becchetti & Solferino 2011; 
Becchetti, Palestini, Solferino & Tessitore 2013). We approach wealth transfer (fairness) costs as an 
explicit function within the profit function of the suppliers, and take as well a different perspective on 
consumer preferences. Specifically, first this paper investigates how and why a firm’s location on 
fairness may change when being confronted with a fairtrade entrant in the market. Second, we observe 
the situation in which a fairtrade supplier is confronted with a conventional supplier starting supplying 
products with a certain (varying) fairness content. We use Hotelling’s model on spatial competition to 
obtain insights in the interrelation between prices, cost structures and the amount of wealth transfers 
“produced” and will observe how firms’ decisions influence the wealth transfers to the producers. We 
will end the analysis with suggestions on how these insights can be used by fairtrade movement actors, 
conventional firms’ strategies and possible government policies. Finally, we will suggest issues for 
further investigation and reflect upon the ability of markets to produce transfers to smallholders 
without being inefficient.  Note that the question whether these developments are positive or negative 
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is beyond the scope of this paper. We focus on how the amount of wealth transfers may change, and 
offer a theoretical perspective on these developments in order to observe the effects of competition.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic model in which we model 
the situation of fairtrade before mainstreaming. Section 3 models the situation after the mainstreaming 
of fairtrade. Section 4 provides a deeper analysis in which two firms start competing and enter each 
other’s markets, in which also different cost structures are taken into account. Section 5 provides 
(preliminary) conclusions and issues for discussion.   
2. The basic model 
Hotelling’s model on spatial competition (1929) has been widely discussed and used within the field 
of marketing and industrial organization. The original model aims at demonstrating that when two 
rational (profit-maximizing) competing firms choose geographical locations in a market they will end 
up next to each other. The firms aim at serving the whole market, and grasping as much market share 
as possible. Prices will be decreased until the point is reached in which the consumer is indifferent in 
choosing from which firm to buy. Prices and locations are determined simultaneously. The firms will 
therefore be located next to each other – in the center of the market. In this scenario we take 
geographical space as “fairness space”, as this competition model can be extended to a product 
characteristic space with non-profit maximizing firms as well (Gabszewicz 1999; Hotelling 1929; 
Moorthy 1985).  
We will discuss the basic set-up of our model by determining how the market functioned before the 
mainstreaming of fairtrade. We assume that for a specific good (such as coffee or chocolate) two 
strictly separated, monopolistic market parts exist: one in which conventional products are exchanged, 
the other in which products containing fairness are exchanged. The conventional market is 
characterized by a profit-maximizing monopolist, whereas the other market part is supplied by a firm 
that also adheres to other principles than profit maximization. The supplier of fairtrade products offers 
its producers higher compensation because from a fairness perspective this firm believes that these 
producers should receive higher prices than in conventional business transactions. These principles 
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result in a higher amount of payments –wealth transfers– to suppliers than in the conventional market. 
The two markets are separated by a “border” of awareness and information; consumers in the 
conventional market do not know or are not aware of the (existence) of (un)fair products, whereas 
consumers in the market for fairtrade products consciously purchase the products in that market, and 
know what fairtrade principles entail.  In our model, “wealth transfers” is defined as the total amount 
of money transferred to the smallholders in producing countries. We will denote the total amount of 
transfers by S. We assume furthermore that a most fair position       and a least fair position 
      can be determined on a fairness continuum, related to the extra amount of s per product paid 
to the smallholders.  
As mentioned before we take geographical space as fairness space, and assume a line of unit-length on 
which consumers are distributed uniformly according to their fairness content preferences. Consumers 
have inelastic unit demands and their position on the fairness line is denoted by        . The total 
number of consumers is normalized to one. We assume that a share    are located in the conventional 
market so that      is the market share for the fair product firm. For now, we assume that the 
conventional firm’s market share is larger than the fairtrade supplier’s,        2, that it is 
exogenously given, and fixed.  
Firms differ in the fairness content they offer and their positions are denoted by        
   for the 
conventional firm and       
     for the fair firm. We furthermore assume the existence of perfect 
information; consumers have a correct perception regarding the amount of wealth transfers each firm 
offers.  
Consumers will buy the product as long as their maximum willingness to pay ( ) equals or exceeds 
the price of the product (  ) and the psychological costs they incur if they do not get their preferred 
fairness level (  ). The utility            a consumer derives from buying a good is therefore: 
             
        
                                                          
2
 This can be observed in reality as well, since World shops and other alternative shops have a smaller market 
share (as fairtrade still has) in comparison with other suppliers of fairtrade products such as supermarkets.  
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which must be positive for a consumer to buy the good.  
In the conventional market we assume that consumers are completely inelastic with respect to the 
fairness amount delivered (they either do not face costs for buying below their fairness standard or 
they are unaware) and we set their    equal to zero:     
3
. Hence,        . 
Within the fairtrade product market we assume for now that consumers have a higher willingness to 
pay for fairtrade products than in the conventional markets. However consumers in this market have 
different willingness to pay for fairness, and face costs when buying a product above their fairness 
standard, hence in case       . Fair product consumers prefer to buy from a nonprofit-maximizing 
firm that maximizes fairness transfers to its small producers, however their willingness to pay can 
vary, influenced by the factor     and their distance towards the fairtrade product.  
               
                          for  
         
                                  for  
         
We assume that in both markets one supplier of the good exists hence both markets are characterized 
by a monopolist supplier. Within a standard Hotelling setting (with positive and symmetric  ) the 
conventional profit-maximizing monopolist would end up in the middle of the market in order to serve 
the whole market. All consumers between   and    have to be served, therefore the optimal location 
for the firm is    
  
 
. The price charged depends on the consumers’ maximum willingness to pay and 
the distance costs, hence      
 
 
. 
Our set-up will be different. Assume that the conventional firm faces variable costs denoted by  , 
reflecting the payments per product to the producers in the supply chain of the conventional firm. 
Besides these costs, the conventional firm has a fixed cost   which is determined exogenously and 
does not affect the outcomes of the model in this set-up. We set     . The profits π of the 
monopolist are: 
                                                          
3
 For simplicity we have assumed that these consumers are also distributed uniformly along the line. It could be 
the case as well that these consumers are not uniformly distributed, but are all clustered in location    . This 
could be due to the fact that these consumers require a fairness level of zero, or do not care about fairness. We 
assumed here that      in order not to complicate this issue further.  
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With consumer’s utility function        , the highest price the profit maximizing firm can ask is 
    .  
Furthermore, because      the conventional supplier can choose any position on the segment a   [0, 
x*]. Consumers are not aware or not interested in fairness and do not face (dis)utility when buying a 
good further away from their preferred variety. The firm’s location does not affect prices and profits. 
However, by choosing a position of      the supplier runs the risk of raising consumer awareness 
and interest in fairness. This may influence its profits in the future, requiring the conventional firm to 
locate to the left. More fairness content implies more costs and fewer profits for the firm due to extra 
fairness transfers to its producers. Hence in the conventional market the firm optimally locates itself in 
      (Becchetti & Huybrechts 2008).  
The profit function of the fairtrade firm is different. We assume that fairtrade firms find that the 
payments c to producers in the conventional market are not sufficient in guaranteeing a certain level of 
well-being. For that reason these firms either transfer all their profits to the producers, or add a 
surcharge s > 0 to their payments to local producers. In the latter situation, the profit function of the 
fairtrade firm becomes:  
                     
                
       
where we assume that the fixed and marginal costs (  and  ) the fairtrade firm faces are the same as 
for the conventional firm. The height of the surcharge   can be seen to reflect the level of fairness of 
the firm. That is, more fairness implies a higher  . In fact, one could argue that the fairtrade firm’s 
goal is to maximize  ; for fairtrade firms other considerations than profit-maximization play a role as 
well. However, in the current set-up with a fairtrade monopoly and unit consumer demand the 
maximization of s leads to the same outcomes as profit maximization would.  
At the demand side, the highest price the fairtrade firm can reach is when it locates at position     
 , as it aims at serving all consumers in its market. In that case,    
                and profits 
8 
 
become    
                
    . We assume here, that consumers’ willingness to pay     
increases according to their fairness preference. In other words, the higher a fairtrade consumers’ 
fairness position   between        and  , the more the person is willing to pay for fairness. To reach 
all the consumers in the market, the fairtrade firm sets the same price as the conventional firm. The 
maximum level of s –denoted by   – the fairtrade firm can afford to pay is therefore        
 
    
 . 
This makes overall profits zero and the operational profits just enough to cover fixed costs. The total 
amount of additional payments to local producers is          . In comparison to the conventional 
firm, the fairtrade product firm asks the same price, but transfers all of its profits to its producers 
instead of keeping it for the own company and/or shareholders. Alternatively, the fairtrade firm could 
decide to retain some of the profits as well, setting   below   . It is reasonable to assume however that 
the firm locating at the highest level of fairness also pays the highest amount of  . This also provides a 
natural benchmark for the analysis in later sections, where we will introduce an explicit functional 
form for the relation between    and  .  
We illustrate the situation in the market before mainstreaming in Figure 1 below. In the next section 
we will point out that when the border blurs, the market situations results in duopolistic competition. 
This allows us to analyze the effects of mainstreaming for fairness in the market.   
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3. Effects of Mainstreaming: two markets become one 
The mainstreaming of fairtrade implies that the initial fairtrade companies are increasingly in conflict 
with retaining their original ideas about fairness transfers. Concessions might be in order, as a result of 
competition with conventional suppliers that also start supplying fairtrade products (Fridell et al. 2008; 
Jaffee & Howard 2010). Since mainstreaming implies that these products are available on a much 
wider scale, reflecting increased societal interest in these types of products, we assume that all 
consumers in the market currently know about fairness principles. The border between the two 
markets thus blurs. There is now one market in which all consumers have a certain fairness preference 
for the product they buy, and where all consumers face psychological costs when buying a product 
below or above one’s preferred fairness location. This has consequences for the way suppliers compete 
in the market. For the conventional firm there might be a growing niche market in which additional 
profits can be grasped; for the fairtrade actors it might imply that extra fairness transfers may be the 
result due to market extension. 
We approach the newly arisen market situation as a duopoly and develop a duopoly model to analyze 
how two product suppliers compete in prices, locations and fairness content. Hotelling’s geographical 
space is (again) taken as fairness space and expressed in terms of a line a of unit-length. The 
conventional supplier initially offers a conventional good, whereas the fairtrade supplier supplies a 
product with fairness content  . Consumers can choose between two identical products, which are only 
differentiated from each other regarding their fairness content. For now we assume that both the 
conventional and the fairtrade supplier maximize their profits. The difference between the two firms 
lies in the assumption that the fairtrade supplier transfers all profits to its producers.   
We assume that all consumers are distributed uniformly along the line   according to their fairness 
preference. The assumption of perfect information still applies; consumers have a correct perception 
on the amount of fairness content delivered by the firm. Total amount of consumers is normalized to 
one, and they have inelastic unit demands. Any time the consumers buy a product below or above their 
fairness standards, they incur costs proportional to the distance denoted by  , with coefficient     
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]0,∞[. This factor denotes how consumers’ fairness preference influences consumers’ utility. We 
reasonably assume that      differs from    as it may be highly likely that these costs will differ per 
product category or time path; in the further analyses we therefore include the possibility of different 
‘distance’ costs. Consumer’s utility depends on their maximum willingness to pay V, prices,    and 
   , and the distance costs,    and    . Consumers will buy the good that yields the highest utility. 
With   ,      > 0 the utility function is given by              
      . In this situation, a 
consumer will buy the conventional (fairtrade) good if           or,          
       
              
       .   
The conventional firm has two variables to maximize its profit: price   and position    on the fairness 
space a   [0,1]. The conventional firm faces cost c, which are the production costs paid to its 
producers. Since the two markets are integrated now and all consumers are aware of fairness content, 
the conventional firm may have an incentive to change from location since adding fairness content 
may imply more market share.  To fix ideas, however, we will first assume that it retains its original 
(monopolist) position of     . 
Furthermore, we assume that the fairtrade firm transfers its profits to the smallholders, whereas the 
conventional firm maximizes its profits. The fairtrade firm adheres to its “fair” principles, implying 
that it wants to transfer a positive amount of   to its producers and stays in      . It will have to see 
what it can transfer to the smallholders, depending on the number of products and price sold in that 
location. We illustrate the procedure to calculate the final wealth transfers in the following paragraph. 
Based on consumer utilities, we derive the market shares in this market situation which are    
 
 
         
         
  and      
 
 
          
         
. Accordingly, based on the profit functions            
   
  and                
     we obtain best-response functions of    
         
 
 and     
       
 
. 
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Based on these, we obtain the Nash prices which are given by   
  
 
 
            and    
  
 
 
           . Nash profits are accordingly for the conventional firm   
  
 
 
            and 
for the fairtrade firm    
  
 
 
          . The total amount of wealth transfers   can then be 
derived, which is generated in this situation by the fairtrade firm:        
 
 
           
Note that the wealth transfers (and profits) are positively related with consumer costs    and    . The 
higher these costs are, the higher the amount of wealth transfers are. This is because    and     are 
positively related with the costs consumers are maximum willing to pay, and we have so far assumed a 
flexible willingness to pay  . Higher    and     imply that consumers are less willing to substitute the 
goods vis-à-vis prices. Since we assume a ‘flexible’ maximum willingness to pay  , prices can 
increase as long as   can increase as well. Figure 2 depicts the newly arisen market situation.     
 
The fairtrade firm is a firm that also adheres to “fair” principles, which implies that it wants to transfer 
a positive amount   to its producers. We assume now that the fairtrade firm faces, besides the 
conventional costs of   and fixed costs  , an extra amount of “costs”  . These costs   are set as a goal 
to be attained by the fairtrade firm in order to transfer these to smallholders as an extra amount of 
money besides the conventional compensation, and are related to its position     as we assume that 
      . Since the fairtrade firm is the only one offering fairness content and since we assume that 
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it is (according to its principles) fully complying to fairness criteria (     ), we set   at the highest 
amount possible,  , which is     . Note that the lowest amount of wealth transfers is expressed as  . 
Furthermore, we assume that also the fairtrade firm at first retains its original (monopolist) position: 
     . Given that      and      , the indifferent consumer is positioned at  
  
 
 
          
      
 
and      
 
 
          
      
. Nash prices follow with values of   
  
 
 
                and 
   
  
 
 
                . Note that the price of the conventional firm increases due to the 
amount of   that is transferred by the fairtrade firm. But since it increases prices of the fairtrade firm 
by more, the conventional firm’s competitive position is enhanced. Increasing fairness content as 
expressed by   could thus be profitable for the conventional firm – as in this setting the firms compete 
in prices and given that their locations are fixed. For the fairtrade firm it implies that it could be 
sensible to lower the amount of   in order to gain markets share, an issue we will consider in the next 
section. Note as well that the competitive position of the fairtrade firm would not be affected had we 
taken transfers as a ‘fixed cost’ type of outlay. Then optimal prices are independent of  . In reality, we 
see of course that both aspects play a role. Seeing wealth transfers as a marginal cost is reminiscent of 
the price premium that fairtrade organisations pay, whereas seeing transfers as fixed costs reflect their 
development premium outlays. From a competitive perspective, the latter may be the better option.  
Wealth transfers   in this market situation are then determined by the following: the amount of   times 
the market share     of the fairtrade firm. Hence,       
 
 
 
          
      
. When we compare those 
to the wealth transfers that were generated in the situation before fairtrade mainstreaming, we note that 
it ultimately depends on the market share of the fairtrade firm what effect will arise regarding the 
difference in total amount of wealth transfers. Specifically,                
 
 
  
           
      
 
        and since we know that 
 
 
           
      
 is the market share in this market situation, we can 
conclude that when the market share is larger than the exogenously determined market share in the 
monopoly situation, the difference in wealth transfers will be positive.  
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4. Competition and the consequences for wealth transfers 
Due to fairtrade mainstreaming it may be profitable for either of the two firms to give up their initial 
locations. We assume consumers’ considerations to remain the same however we analyze firm 
behavior with respect to fairness locations. The fairtrade firm may lower its fairness transfers in order 
to gain more market share and thus increase total fairness transfers, whereas the conventional supplier 
may be induced to increase the amount of fairness content in order to increase market share and 
profits. A consequence might be that total wealth transfers change, depending on how the market 
situation evolves. 
Initially, the fairtrade firm decides to stick to its principles and gives the maximum amount of profit 
residuals possible, hence settles in    . The firm transfers        . We consider the situation in 
which the conventional firm enters the market, and decides which location would be optimal with 
respect to its profits and    . An analysis of prices, market shares, and profits reveals that in this case it 
will be optimal for the conventional firm to move to location of      (see proof appendix). Both 
firms then settle in the same location and share the market, and minimum ethical differentiation is the 
outcome of this market situation. However, the market share of the conventional is twice that of the 
fair firm: respectively     
 
 
  and      
 
 
. The wealth transfers are determined by both the 
transfers of the conventional and the fairtrade firm and become          
 
 
            
which is more than in the initial market situation in which both firms retained their initial positions. 
The difference in wealth transfers, denoted by   , is the following: 
              
 
 
                 
 
 
                        
 
 
           
Hence as long as      wealth transfers will go up. In this market situation, in which the conventional 
firm starts to transfer its profits as well, wealth transfers will increase as long as  
 
 
           
  which essentially means that fixed costs   
 
 
        . However, when we compare the amount 
of wealth transfers with the initial situation before fairtrade mainstreaming – in which both markets 
were characterized by monopoly – then we observe that we need to make some extra assumptions in 
order to compare. So far, we have assumed the maximum willingness to pay V to be flexible, i.e. the 
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prices can rise along with consumer preferences. The maximum wealth transfers that the fairtrade firm 
was able to transfer is determined by        
 
    
 . Assuming here for simplicity reasons that 
prices equal maximum willingness to pay, V = p,    is determined by the factor 
 
    
. It depends on the 
amount of fixed costs F and the market share      of the fairtrade firm whether there will be a 
positive or negative outcome for the amount of wealth transfers. Naturally, however, we can assume 
that within a monopoly situation, both firms ask a higher price than in a duopolistic situation due to 
competitive forces. For the fairtrade firm, we analyze that after mainstreaming its price need to be 
lower than the price of the conventional firm since when        its market share will be zero.  
The same holds for the market situation in which the conventional firm decides not to move, due to for 
example cost motives. When assuming that the fairtrade firm enters the market, and starts to compete 
with the conventional firm we find that the fairtrade firm decides to move to the same position as the 
conventional:         . As profits increase when the fairtrade firm positions in      , also 
increases the wealth transfers. We observe here as well that in order to keep its market share, the 
conventional firm needs to have a lower price than the fairtrade firm. Final wealth transfers are then 
  
 
 
          , and are thus higher than the wealth transfers in the situation in which both firms 
remained in respectively      and      . Depending on the amount of fixed costs, prices and 
market shares, the amount of wealth transfers changes when compared with the monopoly situation in 
which both markets were before the process of mainstreaming.  
Figure 2 shows how the market situation may look like after the firms start to compete in fairness.  
Figure 2: Possible market situation in which the fairtrade firm incorporates fairness within a 
cost function. In the figure, both firms give transfers to the smallholders.   
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In case both firms are able to move we observe that both firms move to the same position as well, 
specifically both move to         . For the conventional, the condition holds that     
  whereas for the fairtrade firm that the costs for buying the fairtrade product should be at least twice 
the costs for buying the conventional good, hence        . In that case, wealth transfers are 
determined by the amount of profits – which is indeed the higher when both firms decide to settle in 
   , namely   
 
 
           . 
Suppose now we consider that the firms do not opt to transfer their profits to the smallholders, 
but however opt to give an additional amount of   besides the conventional compensation of  . We 
assume that the fairness costs are linked to the location the firms take on the fairness continuum, and 
are determined by the explicit function of            
 . 
Again we first consider the market situation in which both firms locate themselves in respectively 
     and      , and calculate with the help of market shares, best-response curves, Nash prices 
and profits, and finally, the total amount of wealth transfers. We assume again that both firms attempt 
to maximize their profits: the conventional firm as usual, the fairtrade firm may use these profits for 
example to increase awareness among consumers or other purposes.  
For now, we assume that the location of the firm has a quadratic relationship with fairness costs, hence 
we take the cost function of            
 . Profit functions then turn into  
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       and   
   
                     
    . 
When both firms initially stick to their initial positions, only the fairtrade firm will transfer profits to 
the smallholders. The amount is determined by              
 
 
  
         
      
 
Within the monopoly situation, the amount of s was mainly determined by the price and amount of 
fixed costs F, whereas here the amount of s is determined mainly by (independent) consumer 
preferences and the amount of fairness content per product  . Under which conditions the 
conventional and fairtrade firm will move when the costs are quadratic, is currently under 
investigation.  
Finally, in case we assume    , when fairness costs are linear with          , different market 
situations arise. We analyze that when the fairtrade firm sticks to its principles and the conventional 
firm moves, a situation of ethical minimization will evolve: the conventional will move towards the 
same position in    . This is however under the condition that as long as     , the conventional 
firm has an incentive to change towards a higher position than initially positioned:   
   . The 
marginal costs of the company for adding fairness, expressed by  , must be larger than the 
psychological consumer costs of buying from a location below one’s preference, expressed in 
monetary terms. This results, compared with the initial situation of fixed positions (as a comparison 
with the monopoly again depends on the amount of F and market shares), in a difference in wealth 
transfers of   
                 
 
 
  
            
      
     
 
 
 
            
      
 
In case the conventional firm remains in it is initial position, the fairtrade firm moves to position 
   . Here, it follows that as long as       and    
     
 
 the fairtrade firm will optimally settle in 
   
   , and otherwise in    
   . At the same time, assuming that indeed the marginal costs for 
fairness   are larger than consumer costs to buy the fairtrade product    , the consumer costs to buy 
the conventional product must be larger than half the difference between consumer costs for the 
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fairtrade product     and the marginal costs for fairness  , i.e. 
     
 
. This results in a difference in 
wealth transfers of zero, as this is the same result as in the initial state of mainstreaming. Furthermore, 
when we compare this with the monopoly situation we see that the difference essentially lies in the 
market share the firms end up with, as well as with the amount of fixed costs present in the monopoly 
situation. Proofs of these results can be found in the appendix.  
A market situation can arise finally, in which both firms are able to move and have to find their 
optimal location. We find that in this market situation, for the linear case there are no solutions to be 
found, and hence this situation results in an unknown result with respect to wealth transfers (see 
appendix).  
To summarise our results, it thus follows that consumer costs, perfect information and the amount of 
fairness per product determine the total amount of wealth transfers in each market situation. Different 
market situations result in different amounts of wealth transfers that can be given to smallholders. The 
way fairness is taken into account within the cost function of the firm will determine where the firm 
will optimally locate. So far, our calculations show that once both firms settle in position of a=1, the 
highest amount of wealth transfers will be transferred and that in this situation the total amount of 
wealth transfers is probably higher than before the process of mainstreaming. Note that the maximum 
willingness to pay V and the resulting prices plays an important role in here.  
5. Conclusion and discussion 
The mainstreaming of the fairtrade movement may on the one hand increase fairness in the market, but 
on the other hand it may result in a decrease of fairness content due to increased competition in the 
ethical dimensions of products. We modeled the situation before mainstreaming in which two 
monopolies exist in one market separated by a border of consumer awareness. We then use this 
framework to see what happens in the market when fairtrade becomes ‘mainstream’ and the border 
blurs. This could imply that a conventional supplier is confronted with a fairtrade entrant supplying 
ethical products, but also that a fairtrade supplier is confronted with a conventional entrant supplying 
products with certain fairness content. We analyze both scenarios, calculating optimal locations and 
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how these depend on consumer preferences and cost differences. This helps indentify circumstances 
that would make it optimal for a firm (also for the fairtrade firm) to move to another location. Whether 
a firm moves towards another location on the fairness continuum depends on what cost perspective is 
taken on fairness, as well as the consumer costs involved. Furthermore, the final difference in wealth 
transfers between the situation before and after mainstreaming hence differs in what situation the 
market develops and the specific characteristics of that market. An important difference arises with 
respect to the way fairness costs are treated. We provided an analysis of the different considerations 
and characteristics of a market and how this influences the amount of wealth transfers, thus providing 
tools for the fairtrade actors how to possibly deal with competition going in within different markets, 
as well as inspiration for managers to see how willingness to pay of consumers and consumer costs 
with respect to fairness can possibly be influenced and/or which strategy the firm should choose with 
respect to fairness.   
The model as developed in this paper suggests several extensions and/or improvements. First, one can 
wonder whether the situation is completely accurate, i.e. in reality the market may rather be 
characterized by monopolistic competition than a duopoly. In combination with other product features 
such as brand and quality, firms maximize their profits. The model might be extended to a three-layer 
model in which firms tradeoff price, quality, and fairness content in order to give a better 
representation of reality. Second, the discrepancy that can arise between the information that 
consumers possess and the “real” information about the actual fairness content can give rise to another 
discussion – so far we have considered only the case in which perfect information about the fairness 
features exists. The model could be extended to a situation in which consumers do not have full 
information. Third, the model could be extended by adding a different way of measuring costs t, since 
people in the extremes of the market might be more/less willing to give up certain utility in order to 
receive more/less fairness content (which might be proof of indeed minimal product differentiation). 
This could be done by making the costs of consumers quadratic. Then the entrant is confronted with 
different market features consequently possibly changing the optimal situation that has to be chosen. 
Fourth, we have taken into account only fairness transfers which are directly transferred to the small 
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producers. We have not taken into account other (positive and negative) effects of fairtrade within this 
model, while this could be as well a factor to be taken into account when evaluating upon the 
effectiveness of the fairness transfers and the way in which actors are willing to move along the 
fairness space they are located on. Finally, one can take also fairness costs as percentage of the profits 
of the firms. Results of these calculations are currently under investigation.  
This paper may further contribute to the discussion on whether firms will start with product 
differentiation (D’Aspremont et al. 1979; Moorthy 1985) or will apply minimal product differentiation 
as Hotelling suggests. We calculate to what degree firms will be ending up in the same ethical 
locations or whether they will differentiate. In addition, the model offers a further think-through of 
what fairness and fairtrade exactly entail. It may contribute to a clarification of what is actually 
happening in the fairtrade market, and what factors contribute to these developments. Especially since 
fairtrade is not present in a range of markets but might be in the future, it is necessary to evaluate upon 
these issues. Finally, how in reality these factors relate to each other and how this may influence 
fairness, can be further investigated via consumer studies which are increasingly being carried out in 
the field of ethical consumption (Examples are: Auger et al. 2003; Basu & Hicks 2008; Creyer & Ross 
1997; De Pelsmacker, Driesen & Rayp 2005; Diaz Pedregal & Ozcaglar-Toulouse 2011; Loureiro & 
Lotade 2005; Paharia, Vohs & Deshpandé 2013). 
Appendix 
I. Overview of results when wealth transfers are treated as profits  
Market situation before mainstreaming: two monopolies 
In the situation before mainstreaming, both markets were characterized by monopolies, in which the 
market shares were determined exogenously, hence the market shares are respectively  
  
      
   
        .  
Prices are determined by  
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Consequently profits functions become 
        
            
         
            .  
Wealth transfers are determined by the amount of S that the fairtrade firm transfers:  
              
            
     
 
Market situation during mainstreaming: duopoly in which firms retain their positions       and  
      
Market shares are determined with the help of consumer utilities:  
   
 
 
           
          
 
     
 
 
           
          
 
From which Nash prices follow 
  
  
 
 
            
   
  
 
 
            
And from which we accordingly derive Nash profits:  
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
Consequently  
       
 
 
             
 
Due to the process of mainstreaming firms start competing – in one situation the conventional enters a 
market in which a fixed fairtrade firm operates in      . In the other situation the fairtrade firm 
enters a market in which a conventional firm is fixed in     . Below the outcomes of competition 
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are shown in the table. Note the symmetry in the two scenarios. Proofs of the locations can be found 
below the table. 
Profits as linear costs Flexible location of 
conventional firm 
  becomes 1;             1 
Flexible location of FT firm 
 
  remains 0;               
 
Market shares 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Nash prices 
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
 
Nash profits 
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
 
Wealth transfers 
          
 
 
 
            
                       
 
 
            
 
Proof that     becomes   =1 
With the help of the profit formula of the firm we can derive the optimal location of the firm:  
   
   
 
 
 
   
              
 
      
   
This formula increases in   , indicating that whenever   goes up, the marginal profits of the firm will 
also increase. Therefore, the optimal location is     . Note this is a corner solution and this results 
in ethical minimal differentiation.  
 
Proof that     becomes       
With the help of the profit formula of the firm, we derive the optimal location of the firm  
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This solution increases in    , indicating that whenever    goes up, the marginal profits of the firm 
will also increase. Therefore, the optimal location is       which is also a corner solution, resulting 
in ethical minimal differentiation.  
 
Mainstreaming can also result in a market situation in which both firms are able to move, ending up in 
a situation of minimum ethical differentiation. Results are shown in the table below. 
 
 
Proof that both firms will settle in a=1 when locations are non-fixed 
We derived with the help of the profit functions, the optimal locations of the firms, from which we 
derive  
    
                  
 
       
 
Both firms move          
 
Market shares 
 
   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
Nash prices 
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
 
Nash profits 
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
 
Wealth transfers 
          
 
 
 
            
 
Locations 
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In both cases it holds that          as the nominator is in both cases larger than the denominator. 
For    the condition holds that        . 
 
II. Results of mainstreaming taking wealth transfers as an explicit profit function of the firm 
The general formula for taking fairness costs as an explicit formula is the following: 
            
 . 
Below we treat the situation in which n=1 
 
The linear cost function case, n=1 
Monopoly situation 
The market shares in monopoly are exogenously determined,  
  
        
   
        .  
Prices in that situation are determined by maximum willingness to pay,  
  
          
   
              .  
Accordingly, profit functions are  
  
          
        
   
                   
        
From which we can derive the final amount of wealth transfers S generated in this market situation:  
            
   
 
Market situation during mainstreaming: duopoly in which firms retain their positions      and 
     . The table below shows the results.  
Profits as linear costs    =0 and        
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Market shares 
     
 
 
         
      
 
 
Nash prices 
  
  
 
 
                
   
  
 
 
              
   
 
Nash profits 
  
   
 
 
 
           
 
      
   
   
  
 
 
 
           
 
      
   
 
Wealth transfers 
     =     
   
 
 
 
  
          
      
 
 
Due to the process of fairtrade mainstreaming, firms start competing – in one situation the 
conventional enters a market in which a fixed fairtrade firm operates in      . In the other situation 
the fairtrade firm enters a market in which a conventional firm is fixed in     . Below the outcomes 
of competition are shown. 
Fairness as linear cost Flexible location of 
conventional firm 
   becomes 1;             1 
Flexible location of FT firm 
 
   remains 0;               
 
Market shares 
 
   
 
 
  
     
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
          
      
 
     
 
 
 
          
      
 
 
Nash prices 
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Nash profits 
  
  
 
 
           
   
  
 
 
           
  
  
 
 
           
 
      
   
   
  
 
 
           
 
      
   
 
Wealth transfers 
              
      
   
           
  
 
 
 
   
         
        
 
 
   becomes      
By differentiating the profit function of the conventional firm with respect to   , after having inserted 
optimal prices and the cost function            , the optimal location of the conventional firm is:  
  
  
                                 
              
 
As long as      the nominator is always larger than the denominator, hence the solution will always 
be larger than 1. Therefore, as long as the costs of fairness exceed consumers’ cost for buying the 
conventional product, the conventional optimally settles in      
 
    becomes       
By differentiating the profit function of the fairtrade firm with respect to the location of the fairtrade 
firm, we fund the following optimal position:  
   
  
    
                   
    
                      
 
The fairtrade firm decides to settle in      , as long as       and    
     
 
 
 
Mainstreaming: a duopoly in which both firms are able to move, facing cost function m(a)=s+ a 
Fairness as linear 
costs  
 
 Duopoly, both are free to move 
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Market shares 
 
      
                   
       
   
 
 
        
 
      
 
      
 
 
                    
 
 
                  
 
      
 
 
Nash prices 
 
  
  
 
 
 
                   
       
  
 
 
        
   
  
 
 
                    
 
 
                  
 
Nash profits 
 
  
                
                  
      
 
         
                               
     
   
                     
     
       
 
         
                                 
      
 
Wealth transfers 
 
 
Undetermined 
Locations 
 
 
 
 
  
      
        
     
 
   
       
        
       
 
 
              
  is undetermined as long as      .  
 
References 
d’Aspremont, C., J.J. Gabszewicz and J. F. Thisse (1979). “On Hotelling’s ’Stability in 
Competition’Econometrica, 47 (5), pp. 1145-1150 
Basu, Arnab K. & Robert L. Hicks (2008). Label performance and the willingness to pay for fair trade 
coffee: a cross-national perspective. ECONSTOR Working paper. ZEF discussion papers on 
development policy, No. 125  
Becchetti, Palestini, Solferino & Tessitore (2013). The Socially Responsible Choice in a Duopolistic  
Market: A Dynamic Model of “Ethical Product” Differentiation. Research Paper Series. Vol. 
11 (5) no. 268 
Becchetti & Solferino (2011). On ethical product differentiation. CEIS Working Paper series 
(forthcoming version). 
27 
 
Becchetti, Leonardo & Benjamin Huybrechts (2008). The Dynamics of Fair Trade as a Mixed-form 
Market. Journal of Business Ethics (81), pp. 733-750 
Becchetti, Leonardo, Luisa Giallonardo & Elisabetta Tessitore (2006). Consumer driven market 
mechanism to fight inequality: in the case of CSR/product differentiation models with 
asymmetric information. ECINEQ Working Paper 2006 – 50  
Becchetti, Leonardo & Nazaria Solferino (2005). The dynamics of ethical product differentiation and 
the habit formation of socially responsible consumers. Working Paper no. 8. Universita di 
Bologna. 
Becchetti, Leonardo & Nazaria Soferino (2003). On ethical product differentiation. CEIS Working 
Paper series 
Becchetti, Leonardo & Fabrizio Adriani (2002). Fair trade: a “third generation welfare” mechanism to 
make globalization sustainable. 
Codron, Jean-Marie, Lucie Siriex & Thomas Reardon (2006). Social and environmental attributes of 
food products in an emerging mass market: Challenges of signaling and consumer perception, 
with European illustration. Agriculture and Human Values (2006) Vol. 23, pp. 283-297 
Davies, Iain A. (2007). The eras and participants of fair trade: an industry structure/stakeholder 
perspective on the growth of the fair trade industry. Corporate Governance 7 (4), pp. 455-470 
De Pelsmacker, Patrick, Liesbeth Driesen & Glenn Rayp (2005). Do Consumers Care about Ethics? 
Willingness to Pay for Fair-Trade Coffee. Journal of Consumer Affairs, 39 (2), pp. 363-385 
Diaz Pedregal, Virginia & Nil Ozclar-Toulouse (2011) Why does not everybody purchase fair trade 
products? The question of the fairness of fair trade products’ consumption for consumers. 
International Journal of Consumer Studies 35, pp. 655-660 
Doherty, Bob, Iain A. Davies & Sophie Tranchell (2013). Where now for fair trade? Business History 
55 (2), pp. 161-189 
FLO (2013). Website: www.fairtrade.net  
FLO (2011-2012). Annual Report. For Producers With Producers.  
FLO (2010-2009). Annual report. Growing Stronger Together. 
Fridell, M., I. Hudson and M. Hudson (2008). “With Friends Like These: The Corporate Response to 
Fair Trade Coffee”. Review of Radical Political Economics, 40 (1), pp.8-34. 
Gabszewicz, Jean J. (1999). Strategic Interaction and Markets. Oxford University Press.   
Gielissen, Robert & Johan Graafland (2009). Concepts of price fairness: empirical research into the 
Dutch coffee market. Business Ethics: A European Review 18 (2), pp. 165-169 
Giovannucci, Daniele & Stefano Ponte (2005). Standards as a new form of social contract? 
Sustainability initiatives in the coffee industry. Food Policy 30, pp. 284-301  
Goodman, Michael (2010). The mirror of consumption: celebritization, developmental consumption 
and the shifting politics of fair trade. Geoforum 41 (1), pp. 104-116 
Goodman, M. K. (2004). Reading fair trade: political ecological imaginary and the moral economy of 
fair trade foods. Political Geography 23 (7), pp. 891-915. 
Hertz, Norena (2002). De Stille Overname. De globalisering en het einde van de democratie. 
Uitgeverij Contact. Dutch translation of The Silent Take Over 
Hira, Anil & Jared Ferrie (2006). Fair Trade: Three Key Challenges for Reaching the Mainstream. 
Journal of Business Ethics 63, pp. 107-118 
Hotelling, H. (1929). “Stability in Competition”. The Economic Journal, 39 (153), pp. 41-57 
28 
 
Howard, Philip H. & Daniel Jaffee (2013). Tensions between Firm Size and Sustainability Goals: Fair 
Trade Coffee in the United States. Sustainability 5, pp. 72-89 
Irving, Sarah, Rob Harrison & Mary Rayner (2002). Ethical Consumerism – Democracy Through The 
Wallet 
Jaffee, Daniel & Philip H. Howard (2010). Corporate cooptation of organic and fair trade standards. 
Agric. Hum. Values 27, pp. 387-399 
Klein, Naomi (2004). No Logo. Lemniscaat (Dutch translation of No Logo)  
LeClair, M.S. (2002). Fighting the Tide: Alternative Trade Organizations in the Era of Global Free 
Trade. World Development 30 (6), pp. 949-958  
Loureiro, Maria L. & Justus Lotade (2005). Do fair trade and eco-labels in coffee wake up the 
consumer conscience? Ecological Economics 53, pp. 129-138 
Low, Will & Eileen Davenport (2005). Has the medium (roast) become the message? The ethics of 
marketing fair trade in the mainstream. International Marketing Review 22 (5), pp. 494-511 
Low, Will & Eileen Davenport (2006). Mainstreaming fair trade: adoption, assimilation, 
appropriation. Journal of Strategic Marketing 14, pp. 315-327 
Max Havelaar (2013). Website: www.maxhavelaar.nl  
Moore, G., J. Gibbon and R. Slack (2006). “The mainstreaming of Fair Trade: a macromarketing 
perspective”, Journal of Strategic Marketing (14), pp. 329-352 
Moorthy, K. Sridhar (1985). Using Game Theory to Model Competition. Journal of Marketing 
Research 3, pp. 262-282 
Paharia, Neeru, Kathleen D. Vohs & Rohit Deshpandé (2013). Sweatshop labor is wrong unless the 
shoes are cute: Cognition can both help and hurt moral motivated reasoning. Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes 121, pp. 81-88 
Raynolds, Laura T. (2002). Consumer/Producer Links in Fair Trade Coffee Networks. Sociologia 
Ruralis 42 (4), pp. 404-424 
Raynolds, Laura T. (2009). Mainstreaming fair trade coffee: from partnership to traceability, World 
Development, Vol. 37 (6), pp. 1083-1093  
Renard, Marie-Christine (1999). The Interstices of Globalization. Sociologia Ruralis, (39) 4, pp. 484-
500 
Smith, Julia (2010). Fair Trade and the Specialty Coffee Market. Growing Alliances, Shifting 
Rivalries. In: Lyon, Sarah M. & Mark Moberg (Eds.). Fair Trade and Social Justice: Global 
Ethnographies. New York University Press, New York.  
Valkila, Joni, Pertti Haaparanta & Niina Niemi (2010). Empowering Coffee Traders? The Coffee 
Value Chain from Nicaraguan Fair Trade Farmers to Finnish Consumers. Journal of Business 
Ethics 97, pp. 257-270 
 
 
